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Abstract
We consider a model where two adversaries can spend resources in acquiring public infor-
mation about the unknown state of the world in order to influence the choice of a decision
maker. We characterize the sampling strategies of the adversaries in the equilibrium of the
game. We show that, as the cost of information acquisition for one adversary increases,
that person collects less evidence whereas the other adversary collects more evidence. We
then test the results in a controlled laboratory setting. The behavior of subjects is close to
the theoretical predictions. Mistakes are relatively infrequent (15%). They occur in both
directions, with more over-sampling (39%) than under-sampling (8%). The main differ-
ence with the theory is the smooth decline in sampling around the theoretical equilibrium.
Comparative statics are also consistent with the theory, with adversaries sampling more
when their own cost is low and when the other adversary’s cost is high. Finally, there is
little evidence of learning over the 40 matches of the experiment.
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1 Motivation
The literature on the economics of information has devoted considerable effort to under-
stand the strategic use of private information by agents in the economy. However, less is
known about the strategic collection of information, yet economic examples of this situa-
tion abound. For example, lobbies and special interest groups spend substantial resources
in collecting and disseminating evidence that supports their views. The US legal system
is based on a similar advocacy principle: prosecutor and defense attorney have opposite
objectives, and they each search and provide evidence on a given case in an attempt to tilt
the outcome towards their preferred alternative. In a similar vein, firms acquire and reveal
through advertising information about the desirable attributes of their products and the
undesirable attributes of the competitors’ products. In this paper, we build a theoreti-
cal model to understand the incentives of individuals to collect information in strategic
contexts. The results are then tested in a controlled laboratory setting.
We consider a simple theoretical framework where two agents with opposite objectives
(the adversaries) can acquire costly evidence. When both adversaries choose to stop the
acquisition of information, a third agent (the decision maker) makes a binary choice.
Formally, there are two possible events. Nature draws one event from a common prior
distribution. The adversaries can then acquire signals that are imperfectly correlated with
the true event. Information affects the belief about the true event and is public, in the
sense that all the news collected by one adversary are automatically shared with the other
adversary and the decision maker. The mapping between the information and the decision
maker’s choice is deterministic and known: it favors the interests of one adversary if the
belief about the relative likelihood of states is below a certain threshold, and it favors the
interests of the other adversary if the belief is above that threshold.
There are two reasons to assume public rather than private information: realism and
simplicity. In the case of jury trials, for example, it is explicitly forbidden that prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys withhold information from other parties. Also, with private
acquisition of information, the incentives to acquire and transmit information are inter-
related. This complicates both the theoretical and the experimental analyses. Since the
existing literature has extensively studied the transmission of information, we choose to
focus instead on the acquisition of information.
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Opposite incentives implies that adversaries never acquire costly information simulta-
neously. Indeed, when the current evidence implies that the decision maker will favor the
interests of one adversary, extra evidence can only hurt him so he will not have incentives
to acquire further information. However, if the current evidence favors the other adver-
sary, then he must trade-off the cost of acquiring more information with the likelihood
that such information will revert the decision. As the belief becomes more and more ad-
verse, the likelihood of reverting it decreases and the expected sampling cost necessary to
achieve a belief reversal increases, so the net gain of accumulating evidence goes down.
Overall, when the belief is mildly against the interests of one adversary, that adversary
acquires information. He keeps sampling up to a point where either the belief is reversed,
in which case the other adversary starts the sampling process over, or else it has become
so unfavorable that it is preferable to give up. Solving this problem analytically is non-
trivial, since the value function of each adversary depends on the sampling strategy of both
adversaries. Indeed, the value of sampling for information in order to ‘send the belief to
the other camp’ depends on how intensely the other adversary will sample for information
himself, and therefore how likely he is to ‘bring the belief back’. In Proposition 1, we de-
termine the best response strategies of each adversary as a function of the common belief
about the state and the cost of sampling for each adversary. We provide an analytical
characterization of the Markov equilibrium, and perform some comparative statics: when
the cost of news acquisition for an adversary increases, that adversary has fewer incentives
to collect evidence, whereas the other adversary has more incentives to collect evidence.
We then report an experiment that analyzes behavior in this information acquisition
game with two adversaries. We study variations of the game where each adversary may
have a low or a high unit cost of sampling. The structure of the game is therefore identical
in all treatments, but the equilibrium levels of sampling are not. Our first and main result,
is that the empirical behavior in all treatments is close to the predictions of the theory both
in action space (Result 1) and in payoff space (Result 2). This conclusion is remarkable
given that the optimal stopping rule of an adversary is fairly sophisticated, it involves
strategic considerations about the other adversary’s choice, and it prescribes corner choices
(for a given belief, either never sample or always sample). To be more precise, the optimal
action of an adversary who is currently unfavored by the existing evidence depends on
whether the common belief is mildly adverse (in which case he should sample) or strongly
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adverse (in which case he should stop), where the cutoff between ‘mildly’ and ‘strongly’
depends on the cost of sampling. We show that the adversary takes the decision predicted
by theory with probability 0.85 (0.92 when he should sample for information and 0.61
when he should not). Furthermore, the best response to the empirical strategy of the other
adversary is to play the Markov equilibrium, which reinforces the idea that deviations from
equilibrium play are small. Similar results are obtained when we analyze choices in payoff
space: given their empirical behavior, an adversary loses less than 5% of the payoff he
would obtain if he best responded to the strategy of the other adversary.
Second, we study in more detail the deviations observed in the data. The main differ-
ence with the theoretical predictions is the smooth rather than sharp decline in sampling
around the theoretical equilibrium. We also show that mistakes occur in both directions.
In general, there is more over-sampling than under-sampling. Also, under-sampling occurs
relatively more often when the adversary’s own cost is low and over-sampling occurs rel-
atively more often when the adversary’s own cost is high (Result 3). Because the decline
in sampling is smoother than it should, it is also instructive to perform some comparative
statics. The predictions of the theory are also supported by the data in that dimension.
As the cost of sampling for an adversary increases, that adversary is less likely to acquire
information whereas the other adversary is (weakly) more likely to do so. That conclusion
holds in the empirical analysis at the aggregate level using Probit regressions on the prob-
ability of sampling, and at the state-by-state level using mean comparisons of sampling
between cost pairs (Result 4). Finally, there is little evidence of learning by the adversary
unfavored by the existing evidence, possibly because the problem is difficult, the feedback
is limited and, most importantly, the choices are close to equilibrium right from the outset.
The adversary favored by the existing evidence makes few mistakes at the beginning and
learns to avoid them almost completely by the end of the session (Result 5).
The paper is related to two strands of the literature, one theoretical and one experi-
mental. On the theory side, Brocas and Carrillo (2007) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2008)
provide models of acquisition of public information. The former is technically similar
to ours but considers only one agent and free information. It thus ignores the strategic
component of optimal sampling and the cost-benefit trade-off. It shows how an individ-
ual can affect the choices of others by selectively deciding whether to acquire or avoid
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public information.1 The latter considers a closer setting to ours where two agents with
conflicting preferences collect costly information. It shares with the present paper the
strategic substitutability result of the sampling cutoffs of players. The model, however,
is specified in quite different terms: decisions are made in continuous time and agents
choose the instantaneous intensity of sampling. This formulation is elegant but unsuitable
for an experiment. Finally, there is an older literature on games of persuasion (Matthews
and Postlewaite (1985) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) among others) that studies the
ex-ante incentives of firms to acquire verifiable information given the ex-post willingness
to reveal it to consumers depending on its content.
On the experimental side, there is an extensive literature on search for payoffs in an in-
dividual decision making context (see e.g. Schotter and Braunstein (1981) and the surveys
by Camerer (1995) and Cox and Oaxaca (2008)). The common finding is that subjects
stop the search process either optimally or excessively soon. Risk aversion may account
for the observed insufficient experimentation. Our paper extends that literature in two
directions: search for information and search in strategic contexts. As pointed by Camerer
(1995, p. 673), a search for information could lead to different conclusions than a search
for payoffs, even though both are formally quite similar. This does not seem to be the case
in our setting. More importantly, the strategic nature of adversarial search substantially
increases the complexity of the decision making problem relative to the individual decision
making counterpart. Surprisingly, we still observe a behavior that is close to theory. The
main difference is that, with strategic sampling, excessive experimentation occurs more
frequently than insufficient experimentation.2
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model and the main
theoretical proposition. In section 3, we describe the experimental procedures. In section
4, we analyze the results, including aggregate behavior in action space and payoff space,
deviations from equilibrium as a function of the costs of both adversaries, comparative sta-
tics (aggregate and state-by-state), and learning. In section 5, we provide some concluding
1Recently, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2009) have approached the one-agent, no-cost model of Brocas and
Carrillo (2007) from a mechanism design perspective and determined general conditions on the preferences
of players such that the agent with the capacity to collect information can benefit from this option.
2Games of persuasion have also been studied in the laboratory. Forsythe, Isaac and Palfrey (1989)
find that behavior in the laboratory approaches the prediction of the sequential equilibrium: there is an
unraveling process by which sellers are trapped into fully revealing their information because buyers assume
the worst whenever sellers withhold it.
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remarks. The proof of the proposition is relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
2.1 The game
Consider a game with three agents. Agent 0 is a decision maker (congress, judge, con-
sumer) who must undertake an action that affects the payoff of all three agents. Agents
1 and 2 are adversaries (lobbies, advocates, firms) who can collect costly evidence about
an event that has realized in order to affect the belief (hence, the action) of the decision
maker. We assume that all the information collected by adversaries becomes publicly avail-
able. Thus, at any point in time, the decision maker and adversaries share the same belief
about which event has realized. However, because adversaries have different preferences
over actions, they will also have different incentives to stop or continue gathering evidence
as a function of the current belief. Whether public information is a realistic assumption
or not depends very much on the issue under consideration. As mentioned before, one
reason to choose this assumption is to isolate the incentives for information gathering. In
that respect, adding private information would only pollute the analysis.
To formalize the information collection process, we consider a simple model. There are
two possible events, S ∈ {B,R} (for “blue” and “red”). One event is drawn by nature but
not communicated to any agent. The decision maker must choose between two actions,
a ∈ {b, r}. Both the payoff of the decision maker and the payoff of adversary i (∈ {1, 2})
depend on the action and the event realized, and they are denoted by v(a |S) and ui(a |S),
respectively. The expected payoffs are:
v(a) ≡
∑
S
Pr(S)v(a |S) and ui(a) ≡
∑
S
Pr(S)ui(a |S)
To preserve symmetry, we assume that the common prior belief that the event is B is
Pr(B) = 1/2. At each stage, each adversary i simultaneously decides whether to pay a
cost ci (> 0) in order to acquire a signal s ∈ {β, ρ}, which is imperfectly correlated with
the true event. Formally:
Pr[β |B] = Pr[ρ |R] = θ and Pr[β |R] = Pr[ρ |B] = 1− θ
where θ ∈ (1/2, 1). Because the prior is common and all the information is public, all
agents have common posterior beliefs about the likelihood of each event. Also, in this
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simple framework, bayesian updating implies that the posterior belief depends exclusively
on the difference between nβ, the number of β-signals, and nρ, the number of ρ-signals
accumulated by adversaries. Formally:
Pr(B |nβ, nρ) ≡ µ(n) = 1
1 +
(
1−θ
θ
)n
where n ≡ nβ − nρ ∈ Z. Thus, for the purpose of the posterior held, two opposite signals
cancel each other out. From now on, we will refer to n as the state. It is immediate that
µ(n+1) > µ(n) for all n, limn→−∞ µ(n) = 0 and limn→+∞ µ(n) = 1. We assume that from
the decision maker’s viewpoint there is one “correct” action for each event: action b if the
event is B, and action r if the event is R. Formally, v(b|B) > v(r|B) and v(b|R) < v(r|R).
As a result, there will always exist a belief µ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that v(b) ≥ v(r) if and only if
µ ≥ µ∗. This can be equivalently expressed in terms of the state: there will always exist
a state n∗ ∈ Z such that v(b) ≥ v(r) if and only if n ≥ n∗.
2.2 Optimal stopping rule with two adversaries
Suppose that two adversaries can collect public evidence. For simplicity, suppose that one
adversary wants the decision maker to take action b independently of the event realized,
and the other adversary wants the decision maker to take action r also independently of
the event realized.3 From now on, we call them the blue adversary and the red adver-
sary, respectively. Formally, the payoffs of the blue and red adversaries are, respectively,
(uB(b) = piB, uB(r) = 0) and (uR(b) = 0, uR(r) = piR) with piB > 0 and piR > 0.
Adversaries can acquire as many signals s ∈ {β, ρ} as they wish. The cost of each signal
is cB for the blue adversary and cR for the red adversary. The timing is as follows. At each
stage, adversaries simultaneously decide whether to pay the cost of acquiring one signal
or not. Any signal acquired is observed by all agents (decision maker, blue adversary, and
red adversary). Agents update their beliefs and move to a new stage where adversaries
can again acquire public signals. When both adversaries decide that they do not wish to
collect any more information, the decision maker takes an action and the payoffs of all
agents are realized.
3This assumption is without loss of generality. What we need for the theory is a vector of preferences
such that the decision maker has conflicting interests with one adversary for beliefs in one compact set and
conflicting interests with the other adversary for beliefs in another compact set.
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In this setting, adversaries have opposite incentives and compete to provide informa-
tion. Remember that, given the decision maker’s utility described in section 2.1, there is
a state n∗ such that v(b) > v(r) if n ≥ n∗ and v(b) < v(r) if n ≤ n∗ − 1. We normalize
his payoffs in such a way that n∗ = 0.4 It is then immediate that the blue adversary will
never collect evidence if n ≥ 0, as the current belief implies the optimal action from his
viewpoint. For identical reasons, the red adversary will never collect evidence if n ≤ −1
(from now on, we will say that the blue adversary is “ahead” if n ≥ 0 and “behind” if
n ≤ −1). Define λ ≡ 1−θθ (< 1), FB ≡ cB(1+λ)1−λ and FR ≡ cR(1+λ)1−λ . Although technically
non-trivial, it is possible to characterize analytically the optimal sampling strategies under
competing adversaries. We focus on Markov equilibria where the state variable is n, the
difference between the number of ρ and β signals.
Proposition 1 The red adversary samples if and only if n ∈ {0, ... , h∗ − 1} and the
blue adversary samples if and only if n ∈ {−l∗ + 1, ... ,−1}. The equilibrium cutoffs are
h∗ = argmaxh Πrn(l∗, h) and l∗ = argmax l Πbn(l, h∗), where:
Πrn(l, h) =
1
1 + λn
[(
piR(1 + λl)− FR(h+ 1)(1− λl)
)[ λn − λh
1− λh+l
]
− FR(h− n)(1− λn)
]
,
Πbn(l, h) =
1
1 + λn
[(
piB(1 + λh)− FB(l − 1)(1− λh)
)[1− λn+l
1− λh+l
]
+ FB(n+ l)(1− λn)
]
.
Adversaries sample more if their cost is lower and their benefit is higher. Also, the stopping
thresholds of adversaries are strategic substitutes, so an adversary samples more if the cost
of the other adversary is higher and the benefit of the other adversary is smaller.5
Proof: see Appendix.
The idea is simple. Two adversaries with conflicting goals will never accumulate ev-
idence simultaneously. Indeed, for any given belief, one of the adversaries will be ahead
4It could be that v(b) = v(r) for n = n∗. We assume that a strict inequality holds. This way, we do
not need to impose an ad-hoc tie-breaking rule (this point is more important for the experiment than for
the theory).
5These comparative statics are determined by taking derivatives in the profit functions Πrn(h, l) and
Πbn(h, l) (see Appendix). Obviously, there is a strong mathematical abuse in doing so, since h and l have
to be integers. To avoid this technical issue in the experiment, we simply determine for each cost pair
treatment the equilibrium cutoffs by creating a grid: for each integer l we find the integer h that maximizes
Πrn(l, h) and for each integer h we find the integer l that maximizes Π
b
n(l, h) and use these values to find
the equilibrium. Naturally, the same comparative statics hold.
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and therefore will not have incentives to collect information as it can only hurt his inter-
ests. Suppose now that n ≥ 0. The red adversary (who is currently behind) can choose to
collect evidence until he is ahead (that is, until he reaches n = −1), in which case either
the other adversary samples or action r is undertaken yielding a payoff piR. Alternatively,
he can cut his losses, stop the sampling process, and accept action b that yields a payoff
of 0. As the difference between the number of blue and red draws increases, the likelihood
of reaching n = −1 decreases and the expected number of draws in order to get to −1
increases, making the sampling option less interesting. This results in an upper cutoff h∗
where sampling by the red adversary is stopped. A symmetric reasoning when n ≤ −1
implies a lower cutoff −l∗ where sampling by the blue adversary is stopped. Overall, when
the event is very likely to be B the red adversary gives up sampling, and when the event
is very likely to be R the blue adversary gives up sampling. For beliefs in between, the
adversary currently behind acquires evidence while the other does not. The strategies are
graphically illustrated in Figure 1.
The comparative statics results are rather intuitive: an adversary has higher incentives
to sample the lower his cost and the higher the benefit when his favorite action is taken
by the decision maker. More interestingly, the stopping thresholds of adversaries, h∗ and
l∗, are strategic substitutes. If the red adversary decides to sample more (h∗ increases),
the value for the blue adversary of reaching n = 0 is decreased, since the red adversary is
more likely to find evidence that brings the belief back to n = −1. As a result, the blue
adversary has less incentives to sample (l∗ decreases). Combined with the previous result,
it also means that if the cost of one adversary decreases or the benefit under his favorite
action increases, then the other adversary will engage in less sampling.
3 Experimental design and procedures
We conducted 8 sessions of the two-adversaries game with a total of 78 subjects. Sub-
jects were recruited by email solicitation. Sessions were conducted at The Social Science
Experimental Laboratory (SSEL) at the California Institute of Technology. All interac-
tion between subjects was computerized, using an extension of the open source software
package ‘Multistage Games.’6 No subject participated in more than one session. In each
6Documentation and instructions for downloading the software can be found at
http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu.
8
session, subjects made decisions over 40 paid matches. For each match, each subject was
randomly paired with one other subject, with random rematching after each match.
The experimental game closely followed the setting described in section 2. At the
beginning of each match, each subject in a pair was randomly assigned a role as either red
or blue (from now on, we call them ‘red adversary’ and ’blue adversary’ respectively).7
The event was represented to the subject as an urn, red or blue, drawn by the computer
with equal probability. A red urn contained two red balls and one blue ball. A blue urn
contained one red ball and two blue balls. Subjects knew the number of red and blue balls
in each urn but did not observe which urn was selected by the computer. That is, the true
event remained unknown to subjects.
Each adversary had to decide simultaneously whether to draw one ball from the urn or
not (the sampling strategy). Because there were twice as many red balls than blue balls
in the red urn and twice as many blue balls than red balls in the blue urn, the correlation
between signal and event (ball color and urn color) was θ = 2/3. The cost of drawing
a ball for the red and blue adversaries, cR and cB respectively, was known but varied on
a match-by-match basis as detailed below. If one or both adversaries drew a ball, then
both adversaries observed the color(s) of the ball(s) drawn. The ball was then replaced
in the urn.8 If at least one adversary drew a ball, they both moved to another round
of ball drawing. The process continued round after round until neither of them chose to
draw a ball in a given round. At that point, the match ended, and the computer allocated
a payoff to each adversary which depended exclusively on the color of the balls drawn
by both adversaries.9 More precisely, if the difference between the number of blue and
the number of red balls drawn was 0 or greater, then the blue adversary earned a high
payoff and the red adversary earned a low payoff. From now on, we will say that the blue
adversary “won” the match and the red adversary “lost” the match. If the difference was
-1 or smaller, then the blue adversary lost the match and earned a low payoff, whereas the
7In the experiment, we used neutral terminology: participant in the ‘blue’ role, participant in the ‘red’
role, etc.
8Even though the decision of drawing a ball within a round was taken simultaneously, the balls were
drawn with replacement. That is, adversaries always had 3 balls to draw from (this point was clearly
spelled out in the instructions).
9As shown in Proposition 1, if the adversary unfavored by the evidence accumulated so far prefers not
to draw a ball, then he has no incentives to start the sampling process afterwards. Thus, ending the match
if no adversary draws a ball in a given round shortens the duration of the experiment without, in principle,
affecting the outcome.
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red adversary won the match and earned a high payoff. From these earnings, adversaries
had their ball drawing costs (number of balls they drew times cost per draw) subtracted.
Subjects then moved to another match where they were randomly rematched, randomly
reassigned a role and a new urn was randomly drawn.
There are a few comments on the experimental procedures. First, we wanted to mini-
mize (though not necessarily eliminate at all cost) the likelihood that an adversary earned
a negative payoff in a given match once the costs were subtracted, because this could
result in loss aversion effects. We therefore set the payoffs of winning and losing a match
at 150 points and 50 points respectively, with the costs of sampling being 3 or 13 for
each adversary.10 Second, as in the theory section, roles were not symmetric. We gave
an initial advantage to the blue adversary in order to implement a simple, deterministic
and objective rule for the case n = 0. Finally, we computerized the role of the decision
maker to make sure that sampling did not depend on (possibly incorrect) beliefs about
the decision maker’s choice.
At the beginning of each session, instructions were read by the experimenter standing
on a stage in the front of the experiment room, which fully explained the rules, informa-
tion structure, and computer interface. After the instructions were finished, two practice
matches were conducted, for which subjects received no payment. After the practice
matches, there was an interactive computerized comprehension quiz that all subjects had
to answer correctly before proceeding to the paid matches. Subjects then participated
in 40 paid matches, with opponents and roles (red or blue adversary) randomly reas-
signed and urns randomly drawn at the beginning of each match. The design included
four blocks of ten matches, where the costs pair (cR, cB) was identical within blocks and
different across blocks. The four cost pairs were the same in all sessions. However, to
control for order effects, the sequences were different. Subjects were paid the sum of their
earnings over all 40 paid matches, in cash, in private, immediately following the session.
Sessions averaged one hour in length, and subject earnings averaged $25. Table 1 displays
the pertinent details of the eight sessions.
10The exchange rate was 200 points = $1.00. Notice that in the theoretical analysis, we allowed for the
payoff of winning to be different for the blue and red adversaries (piR R piB). By contrast, the payoff of
losing was normalized to zero in all cases. Naturally, re-scaling payoffs has no consequences for the theory
as long as the difference between winning and losing remains constant.
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4 Results
4.1 Aggregate sampling frequencies
Using Proposition 1, we can compute the theoretical levels of sampling as a function of
the costs of both adversaries. This can serve as a benchmark for comparison with the
empirical behavior. Recall that h∗ and −l∗ correspond to the states where the red and
blue adversary stop sampling, respectively (see Figure 1). These equilibrium cutoffs are
reported in Table 2.
The first cut at the data consists of comparing the empirical probabilities of sampling
by the blue and red adversaries as a function of the state n, the difference between the
number of blue draws and the number of red draws. Table 3 shows the empirical sampling
frequencies and the equilibrium predictions (reported in Table 2) for each cost pair and
pooling all eight sessions together. A graphical representation of the same data is provided
in Figure 2. Although the state space is n ∈ {−6, ... , 7} in the data, we restrict the analysis
to n ∈ {−4, ... , 4}, because there are few observations for choices in states outside this
range (between 0 and 15 depending on the cost treatment).
Despite the data being rather coarse, it allows us to draw two main conclusions. First,
adversaries understand the fundamentals of the game. Indeed, the theory predicts that
both adversaries should never simultaneously draw balls. It is a dominated strategy for
blue to draw when n ≥ 0 and for red to draw when n ≤ −1. Among the 7879 observations
where both adversaries had to simultaneously choose whether to sample, only in 4.8% of
the cases the adversary ahead in the game did draw a ball. Furthermore, 3.2% correspond
to a blue adversary drawing when n = 0. These small mistakes may be partly due to a
misunderstanding of the tie-breaking rule, since the red adversary was significantly less
likely to draw when n = −1. Furthermore and as we will see in section 4.5, these mistakes
were greatly reduced over the course of the experiment. For the rest of the analysis and
except otherwise noted, we will focus on the sampling strategy of the adversary behind in
the game (red when n ≥ 0 and blue when n ≤ −1).
Second, sampling behavior is reasonably close to equilibrium predictions. Using Table
3, we can determine the number of instances where the adversary behind in the game
played according to the predictions of theory. We separate the analysis in two groups.
First, the aggregate data. These include all the observations of the adversary behind in
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the game, separated into the cases where theory predicts draw and the cases where theory
predicts no draw (the data is then pooled across roles). Second, the ‘marginal states.’
These include the observations in the last state where theory predicts that the adversary
behind in the game should draw (h∗ − 1 for red and l∗ + 1 for blue), and the observations
in the first state where theory predicts that the adversary behind in the game should not
draw (h∗ for red and l∗ for blue). The data is compiled in Table 4.
The aggregate data reveals that the proportion of total observations consistent with
the theoretical predictions is high, 85%, especially given that we only consider the choices
of the adversary behind in the game. Also, there is a substantially lower proportion of
under-sampling (in 8% of the observations there is no draw when there should be) than
over-sampling (in 39% of the observations there is draw when there should not be). There
are at least two reasons for such asymmetry. First and by construction, the number
of observations where the player behind has to make his initial sampling decision (red
in n = 0 or blue in n = −1) is relatively large. In these states, adversaries almost
invariably follow the theoretical prediction and sample (between 92% and 100% of the
time). Perhaps more subtly, in equilibrium, an adversary can only under-sample once
in each match, unless the other adversary chooses to sample despite being ahead (a rare
event). By contrast, he can keep over-sampling indefinitely. This, together with the lower
number of observations where the theory predicts no sampling, can partly account for the
asymmetry in percentages.
The study of the marginal states allows us to investigate under- and over-sampling in
more detail (i.e., when adversaries are supposed either to draw for the last time or not
draw for the first time). By definition, the cost-benefit analysis is most difficult to perform
in these states, so we can expect the greatest number of mistakes. As Table 4 shows, there
are 8% fewer observations consistent with theory than when all states are considered.
If we divide the analysis into under- and over-sampling, then the increase in mistakes
is around 5% in the former and 6% in the latter.11 Therefore, although the fraction
of mistakes is non-negligible (13% and 45%), behavior is still reasonably consistent with
theory, especially for the ‘no draw’ case. Notice that the same remark applies as previously:
for example, a red adversary who decides to stop in state x+1 when theory predicts that
11Although the differences are small in magnitude, they are all statistically significant given the large
number of observations.
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he should stop in x will, on average, produce several observations of over-sampling in x in
every match.
Finally, we can also determine the optimal strategy of an adversary who knows the
empirical sampling frequencies of the population. The problem turns out to be challenging
because, contrary to the theoretical model, both adversaries sometimes sample simulta-
neously, and therefore move the state from x to x ± 2. Using numerical methods, we
computed the best response to the empirical strategies for the adversaries in each role and
in each cost treatment. In all eight cases, the best response coincides with the Markov
equilibrium play described in Table 2. This result provides further support to the idea
that adversaries’ choices are close to the theoretical predictions. Indeed, if the strategies
of an adversary were to depart systematically and substantially from equilibrium, the best
responses of the other adversary would also be to depart from the Markov equilibrium.
The results of this section are summarized as follows.
Result 1 The empirical behavior is close to the theoretical prediction in action space.
Best response to the empirical strategies coincide with equilibrium behavior. Deviations
are infrequent and occur in both directions (under- and over-sampling).
4.2 Aggregate payoffs
The next step consists in determining the expected payoffs of adversaries in the states
where they should start sampling (blue at n = −1 and red at n = 0) under different
scenarios. More precisely, we compute three cases: (1) the expected payoffs given the
empirical behavior of both adversaries; (2) the expected payoffs if both adversaries played
according to the Markov equilibrium; and (3) the expected payoff of an adversary who best
responds to the empirical strategy of the other adversary which, given our previous result,
coincides with the equilibrium play. To facilitate comparisons, we normalize the payoffs
of losing and winning the match to 0 and 100 respectively. The results are summarized in
Table 5.12
Comparing (1) and (3), we notice that by deviating from the best response strategy,
adversaries lose at most 3.9 points if their drawing cost is low, and at most 5.0 points
12For more extreme states, the analysis is less informative: payoffs are mostly driven by costs so the
differences between the three cases is small (data not reported but available upon request). We perform
below what we think is a more informative comparison for the marginal states.
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if their drawing cost is high. This is relatively small given that the difference between
winning and losing is 100 points and that the cost per draw is 3 or 13 points. As discussed
in section 4.1, it suggests that adversaries are not far from best responding to the strategy
of their rivals. Comparing (1) and (2), we notice that the empirical choices of adversaries
translate into net gains relative to the Markov equilibrium in 5 cases and net losses in the
other 11, with the magnitudes being always rather small. This provides further evidence
that sampling errors occur in both directions. Indeed, recall that the sum of benefits
is constant across matches. Joint under-sampling is likely to result in lower costs and
therefore higher average payoffs for both adversaries whereas joint over-sampling is likely
to result in higher costs and therefore lower average payoffs (of course, this heuristic
argument assumes a roughly symmetric under- and over-sampling behavior).
The previous comparisons are suggestive but incomplete. Indeed, there can be two
very different reasons for observing small payoff differences between predicted and empir-
ical choices: behaviors are close to each other or payoff functions are flat so even large
departures imply small utility losses. In order to evaluate the cost of deviating from equi-
librium behavior, we conduct the following numerical analysis. We fix the cost treatment,
assume that the first adversary follows the empirical strategy and that the second adver-
sary best responds to it (which, remember, also corresponds to the Markov equilibrium)
at all states but n. We then determine the expected payoff in state n of the second
adversary if he also plays the equilibrium strategy at n and if he plays the alternative
strategy.13 This exercise captures how much is lost by deviating from best response in
one and only one state. The results are summarized in Table 6. We highlight in bold
the payoffs given equilibrium play at all states. So, for example, since h∗ = 3 for the red
adversary in the (3,3) treatment, the bold value is for “draw” in states n ∈ {0, 1, 2} and
for “no draw” otherwise. As before, the payoffs of winning and losing are normalized to
100 and 0 respectively.
From this table, we can determine the utility loss of under-sampling and over-sampling
in the marginal states, for each pair of costs and each role. We notice a wide spread in
the cost of one-unit deviations, which ranges from 0.6 to 17.1 points across treatments.
Also, there are no systematic patterns on the relative losses of under- and over-sampling
13Notice that he may reach state n several times. The assumption is that he either always or never plays
the equilibrium strategy.
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within a treatment. Under-sampling is more costly than over-sampling in 5 cases and less
costly in the other 3. Erring on either side sometimes results in similar costs (3.4 vs. 2.6
points) and some other times in substantially different ones (17.9 vs. 1.9 points). This may
be partly due to the integer nature of the sampling strategies considered. Indeed, when
the optimal stopping point is somewhere between x − 1 and x, the adversary obtains a
similar payoff when he stops at either of these thresholds. In that respect, using a discrete
information accumulation process makes the model more intuitive and easier to explain to
subjects but, at the same time, introduces integer effects that can have an impact on the
results. Finally, we performed the same computations as in Table 6 with one difference.
Instead of best responding, we assumed that the second adversary followed the empirical
strategy at all states but n and then determined the expected payoff given drawing at n
and given not drawing at n. The results were very similar so for the sake of brevity we
decided not to report them. We summarize the findings of this section as follows.
Result 2 The empirical behavior is close to the theoretical prediction in payoff space.
4.3 Deviations
We now explore in more detail the deviations from equilibrium behavior observed in the
data. We start with an analysis of the adversaries’ actions. From inspection of Table 3
and Figure 2, it is apparent that the main difference with the theoretical prediction is the
absence of a sharp decline in the likelihood of sampling around the equilibrium level. In
Table 7 we separate the marginal states into the last state where adversaries are supposed
to draw and the first state where adversaries are supposed to not draw (just like in Table
4). We then report the proportion of sampling in each of these two cases.
Instead of a 100% decline, we observe in the data a decline of 29% to 66%. There
are at least two reasons for this smooth pattern. One is a significant heterogeneity in
individual behavior. Although it is worth noting this possibility, we will not conduct a
detailed individual analysis. Indeed, since the observed behavior is close to the theoretical
prediction, we feel that the added value of an exhaustive exploration at the individual level
would be rather small. The second reason is related to the integer nature of the sampling
strategy, and the idea that when the optimal stopping point is between two cutoffs then
similar payoffs may be obtained by stopping at either of them (see the discussion in section
4.2). Notice that adversaries draw with a substantially higher probability in h∗ − 1 and
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l∗ + 1 when their cost is high than when it is low. Also, in three out of four cases, their
percentage decrease is also greater. This suggests that an adversary with low cost is more
likely both to under-sample and to exhibit a less steep decline in drawing around the
equilibrium than an adversary with high cost.
To further explore how costs affect deviations from equilibrium, we perform the same
analysis as in Table 4, except that we separate the proportion of equilibrium play according
to the adversary’s own cost. The results are displayed in Table 8.
When we pool together all states where the adversary is behind, the results are similar
for low and high costs, simply because in non-marginal states adversaries generally play
close to the equilibrium predictions. More interestingly, in the marginal states, under-
sampling is overall infrequent and more pronounced with low than with high costs (27%
vs. 6%). Over-sampling is more frequent and slightly more pronounced with high than
with low costs (47% vs. 41%).
Next, we study how deviations affect payoffs in the different cost treatments. Com-
paring (1) and (2) in Table 5, we notice that for the (13,13) treatment, the equilibrium
payoffs exceed the empirical payoffs of adversaries in all four cases. By contrast, for the
(3,3) treatment the empirical payoffs exceed the equilibrium payoffs of adversaries in three
out of four cases. This is consistent with the sampling biases discussed previously: joint
under-sampling in the (3,3) treatment results in lower costs for both adversaries and sim-
ilar benefits whereas joint over-sampling in the (13,13) treatment results in higher costs
for both adversaries and similar benefits.14 The result is confirmed if we compare Markov
equilibrium and best response to empirical behavior. When the cost of the red adversary
is low, the blue adversary gets a higher payoff in (3) than in (2) whereas when the cost of
the red adversary is high, the blue adversary gets a higher payoff in (2) than in (3). Since
in both cases the blue adversary is choosing the same (optimal) strategy, this reinforces
the idea that the red adversary has a tendency to under-sample when his cost is low and
over-sample when his cost is high. The same result applies for the red adversary when
the blue adversary has cost 3 but not when the blue adversary has cost 13 (in that case,
payoffs are almost identical in all four cases). However and as previously noted, payoff
differences are generally small.
14The asymmetric cost cases are more difficult to interpret. Over-sampling by the high cost player implies
a lower expected payoff for the low cost player independently of his choice, but also a lower marginal value
of sampling.
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Finally, it is also instructive to compare the utility loss incurred by deviating from
best response for adversaries with high and low cost of sampling. Using Table 6, we notice
that in 3 out of 4 observations, the utility loss for the low cost adversary is bigger with
under-sampling than with over-sampling. Conversely, in 3 out of 4 observations, the utility
loss for the high cost adversary is bigger with over-sampling than with under-sampling. In
either case, the average difference is relatively small. Also, either type of deviation implies
generally a greater loss for an adversary with a high cost than for an adversary with a
low cost: averaging across deviations and roles, the loss is 10.6 when c = 13 and 3.1 when
c = 3. The reason for such difference can be easily explained in the case of over-sampling
by the direct cost of drawing, but it also occurs for under-sampling. Last, notice that the
deviations we observe in the data are precisely the ones that imply higher utility losses:
under-sampling for low cost and over-sampling for high cost. The result is summarized as
follows.
Result 3 The decline in sampling around the theoretical equilibrium is smoother than pre-
dicted by theory. There is under-sampling by adversaries with low cost and over-sampling
by adversaries with high cost. In general, over-sampling is more pronounced than under-
sampling.
4.4 Comparative statics
We now study whether the basic comparative statics predicted by the theory are observed
in the data. To this purpose, we first run probit regressions to compute the probability
of sampling by an adversary as a function of the state. We only include states where the
adversary is behind to ensure a monotonic theoretical relation.15 For each role, we perform
the regression on four subsamples, taking either the adversary’s own cost or the other
adversary’s cost as fixed. In the former case, we introduce a dummy variable that codes
whether the other adversary’s cost was high (high other c). In the latter case, we introduce
a dummy variable that codes whether the adversary’s own cost was high (high own c).
We also analyze sequencing effects by including a dummy variable that codes whether the
particular cost treatment occurred in the first 20 or the last 20 matches of the experiment
(seq. late). Furthermore, remember that subjects played 10 consecutive matches with the
15Also, we already know from the previous analysis that behavior is almost invariably in accordance
with theory when the adversary is ahead.
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same cost pairs. We study a simple version of experience effects by introducing a dummy
variable that separates the first 5 matches from the last 5 matches within a given cost pair
(exp). We also include interactions terms. The results are summarized in Table 9.
Not surprisingly, as the difference between unfavorable and favorable draws increases,
adversaries are less inclined to sample. The effect is strong and highly significant in all
eight subsamples. Similarly, as an adversary’s cost increases, his likelihood of sampling
decreases. Again, the effect is strong and significant at the 1% level in all four subsamples.
The strategic effect on the behavior of an adversary of the other adversary’s cost is more
involved. Proposition 1 states that thresholds are strategic substitutes, so a higher cost
by one adversary translates into more sampling by the other. However, due to the integer
constraints, the theory predicts that an increase in the cost of the red adversary should
translate into a higher level of sampling by the blue adversary if his cost is low and to no
change in sampling if his cost is high (see Table 2). This is precisely what we observe in the
data with the coefficient ‘high other c’ for the blue adversary being positive in both cases
but significant only when cB = 3. For the red adversary, the integer constraint implies no
increase in sampling when the blue adversary’s cost increases both when cR = 3 and when
cR = 13. In the data, the coefficient is significant when the cost of the red adversary is
high. Overall, all four coefficients for ‘high other c’ are positive but two are significant even
though only one should be. The analysis of experience and sequencing in this regression
are deferred to the next subsection.
We next explore different comparative statics on sampling as a function of costs. For
each state n, we compare the average level of sampling across the different cost treatments.
The results are summarized in Table 10. The table can be read as follows. For each state
n, we consider only the adversary behind in the game. We then compute the empirical
average difference in sampling between the column cost pair treatment and the row cost
pair treatment. The number in parentheses beneath each average is the p-value for the
statistical significance of the difference. Finally, we report in brackets the theoretical
prediction: no change in sampling [o], a 100% decrease in sampling [-], or a 100% increase
in sampling [+].
For each state, we then compare the empirical and theoretical change in sampling
between cost pairs. Note that theory predicts either 0% or 100% probability of sampling in
each state (so no change at all or a 100% change between the row and column treatments).
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We code a (positive or negative) empirical change in probability as ‘significant’ when (i)
the magnitude of the (positive or negative) change is at least 10%, and (ii) the change
is statistically significant at the 5% level.16 Using this criteria, we obtain that 23 out
of 24 mean comparisons for the red adversary follow the patterns predicted by theory:
no difference in 15 cases, and a statistically significant decrease in 8 cases. For the blue
adversary, 21 out of 24 mean comparisons follow the patterns predicted by theory: no
difference in 15 cases, a decrease in 4 cases, and an increase in 2 cases. The 3 misclassified
observations are for n = 3. It is due to an insufficient level of sampling in the (13, 3)
treatment and an excessive level of sampling in the (3, 3) treatment, where the empirical
draw rates are 0.52 and 0.45 whereas the predicted rates are 1.0 and 0.0.17 Notice that our
method controls neither for joint correlation between tests (when one sampling departs
significantly from theory, several comparisons are affected) nor for multiplicity of tests (we
make 48 comparisons at a 5% significance level). However, the fact that 44 out of 48 are
correctly classified suggests that the comparative statics are in accordance with theory.
The results of this section are summarized as follows.
Result 4 The comparative statics follow the predictions of theory both in aggregate and
state-by-state: an adversary samples more when his cost is low and when the cost of the
other adversary is high.
4.5 Learning
We now study whether subjects change their behavior over the course of the experiment.
We know from section 4.1 that the proportion of mistakes by adversaries ahead is low
(4.8%). It is nevertheless instructive to determine how these mistakes evolve over time.
The proportion of mistakes is 6.9% in the first 20 matches and 2.6% in the last 20 matches
of the experiment. This suggests that subjects learn to avoid basic mistakes almost entirely
as the experiment progresses.
We then move on to the more interesting case of adversaries who are behind in the
game. A simple approach to determine changes in behavior is to divide the sample into
early sequences (1 and 2, that is, matches 1 to 20) and late sequences (3 and 4, that is,
16In other words, a decrease in sampling from 1.00 to 0.97 (as, for example, between (3, 3) and (13, 13)
for n = 0) is not coded as a change even if the 3% difference is statistically significant.
17Similar results are obtained if we used different criteria for the magnitude of the change (e.g., at least
20% change) and/or the statistical significance (e.g., 1% level).
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matches 21 to 40) or into inexperienced (first 5 matches within a cost pair) and experienced
(last 5 matches). We then determine the proportion of equilibrium play in each subsample.
The results are compiled in Tables 11 and 12.
From Table 11, we notice that over-sampling both in the marginal states and in all
states taken together decreases by roughly 8% when the cost treatment under considera-
tion is played late in the experiment. Under-sampling remains mostly unaffected, partly
because it is quite low to start with. In all four cases, mistakes are reduced. By contrast,
Table 12 suggests that experience within a cost treatment has virtually no effect on the
behavior of adversaries.
A more rigorous look at the data consists in studying significance of the ‘sequence’ and
‘experience’ variables in the Probit regression presented in Table 9. The sequencing effect is
significant for both adversaries when their own cost is high. The positive coefficient of ‘seq.
late’ and negative coefficient when combined with the number of draws behind suggests
that, when that particular cost pair comes late, adversaries sample more if they are behind
by few draws and less if they are behind by many draws, as learning would predict.18 This
effect is not present in any of the other six subsamples. The effect of experience is only
marginally significant in one of the eight subsamples. Overall, the regression provides
limited evidence of learning due to sequencing and none due to experience.
All in all, there is little evidence of changes in sampling behavior over trials. One
possible explanation is that subjects had insufficient exposure to the game (40 matches
under 4 different cost treatments). We tend to favor a simpler explanation: subjects play
relatively close to equilibrium right from the outset, so there is little room for learning.
The result is summarized as follows.
Result 5 Adversaries ahead in the game learn to avoid sampling mistakes almost entirely.
Adversaries behind in the game exhibit limited learning over the course of the experiment.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed a model of information acquisition by adversaries with
opposite interests. We have characterized the Markov equilibrium of the game and shown
18The p-value of ‘seq. late’ for the blue player with high cost is 0.054. The other three are below 5%.
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that the choice variables are strategic substitutes: if the incentives to collect information of
one adversary increase, then the incentives of the other adversary decrease. We have tested
the theory in a controlled environment. As in the individual decision making literature,
behavior of subjects is remarkably close to predictions by theory even if in our game the
strategies are substantially more complex. Mistakes are relatively infrequent and, contrary
to the individual decision making literature, take more often the form of over-sampling
than under-sampling. Comparative statics on the adversary’s own cost and the other
adversary’s cost generally follow the predictions of theory both at the aggregate level and
state-by-state. Finally, there is little evidence of learning.
The study can be extended in several directions. From a theoretical viewpoint, it would
be interesting to combine the acquisition of information and the revelation of information
paradigms. In particular, one could extend the literature on games of persuasion to incor-
porate a sequential process of acquisition of private pieces of non-verifiable information.
This would allow us to determine the optimal stopping rule given the anticipated future
use of private information. From an experimental viewpoint, the similarity between em-
pirical behavior and theoretical predictions is intriguing. It would be interesting to study
behavior in even more sophisticated environments. One possibility would be to consider
three adversaries. When the evidence favors one adversary, which of the other two will
be more likely to acquire information and which one will be more tempted to free-ride?
Another possibility would be to let adversaries choose the accuracy of information, that is,
the correlation between event and signal. A different extension would be to allow adver-
saries to engage in agreements with collusive side transfers that would replace information
acquisition. Because paying for information is inefficient from their joint viewpoint, the
theory would predict always agreement and no sampling. In the experiment, will these
agreements happen frequently? When they occur, will the payoffs of each adversary be
above or below their expected return in the non-cooperative Markov equilibrium with
sampling? A final option would be to use this framework to study bribery, for example by
letting the decision maker play an active role and demand bribes from the adversaries in
exchange of a certain action. Will he be able to extract the full surplus of the adversaries?
These and other related questions are left for future research.
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Appendix: proof of Proposition 1
It is immediate that the blue adversary will never sample if n ≥ 0 and the red adversary
will never sample if n ≤ −1. Also, if at some stage no adversary finds it optimal to sample,
no information is accumulated so it cannot be optimal to restart sampling. Suppose now
that the event is S = B and the state is n ∈ {0, ... , h − 1}, where h is the value where
the red adversary gives up sampling (we will determine this optimal value below). The
value function of the red adversary, denoted grB(n), satisfies the following second-order
difference equation with constant term:
grB(n) = θ g
r
B(n+ 1) + (1− θ)grB(n− 1)− cR.
where θ (1−θ) is the probability of receiving signal β (ρ) given that the event is B, thereby
moving the state to n + 1 (n − 1). Applying standard methods to solve for the generic
term of this equation, we get:
grB(n) = y1 + y2 λ
n + FR n (1)
where λ = (1− θ)/θ and FR = cR/(2θ − 1). In order to determine the constants (y1, y2),
we need to use the two terminal conditions. By definition, we know that at n = h the
red adversary gives up and gets 0. Therefore, grB(h) = 0. The lower terminal condition is
more intricate. We have: grB(−1) = qbBpiR+(1−qbB)grB(0), where qbS is the probability that
the blue adversary reaches n = −l before reaching n = 0 given event S ∈ {R,B} and state
n = −1. In other words, the red adversary knows that when n = −1, the blue adversary
will restart sampling (thus the red adversary will stop paying costs). With probability
qbB, the belief will reach n = −l. The blue adversary will stop at that point and the red
adversary will obtain the payoff piR. With probability 1 − qbB, the belief will go back to
n = 0. The value function of the red adversary will then be grB(0) and he will have to
start sampling again. For the time being, let’s take qbB as exogenous (naturally, we will
need to determine later on what this value is). Using (1) and the two terminal conditions,
we obtain a system of two equations (grB(h) and g
r
B(−1)) with two unknowns (y1 and y2).
Solving this system, we can determine the values (y1, y2) which, once they are plugged
back into (1), yield:
grB(n) =
(
piR q
b
B + FR(1 + h q
b
B)
)[ λn+1 − λh+1
1− λ+ λ(1− λh)qbB
]
− FR(h− n) (2)
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When the event is S = R, the second-order difference equation for the red adversary
is:
grR(n) = (1− θ)grR(n+ 1) + θ grR(n− 1)− cR
where the only difference is that the likelihood of moving the state to n+1 (n− 1) is now
1− θ (θ). Solving in an analogous fashion, we get:
grR(n) =
(
piR q
b
R − FR(1 + h qbR)
)[ 1− λh−n
λh(1− λ) + (1− λh)qbR
]
+ FR(h− n) (3)
At this point, we need to determine qbS . Recall that the blue adversary gives up at
n = −l (where −l will be determined below). Let hbS(n) denote the blue adversary’s
probability of reaching n = −l before n = 0 given event S and a starting state n. Using
the by now familiar second-order difference equation method, we have:
hbB(n) = θ h
b
B(n+ 1) + (1− θ)hbB(n− 1) with hbB(−l) = 1 and hbB(0) = 0
and
hbR(n) = (1− θ)hbR(n+ 1) + θ hbR(n− 1) with hbR(−l) = 1 and hbR(0) = 0
Note that hbS(·) captures exclusively the blue adversary’s likelihood of reaching each
stopping point (−l or 0), that is, it does not take costs into consideration. This is the
case because in the red adversary’s calculation only the probabilities matter (not the net
utility of the blue adversary). Solving for the generic term in a similar way as before, we
now get:
hbB(n) =
λl+n − λl
1− λl and h
b
R(n) =
1− λ−n
1− λl .
This implies that:
qbB ≡ hbB(−1) =
λl−1 − λl
1− λl and q
b
R ≡ hbR(−1) =
1− λ
1− λl
Inserting the expressions of qbB in (2) and q
b
R in (3), we can finally determine g
r
B(n)
and grR(n) as a function of the parameters of the model.
Note that Pr(B |n) = µ(n) = 11+λn and Pr(R |n) = 1 − µ(n) = λ
n
1+λn . The expected
payoff of the red adversary given state n ∈ {0, ..., h− 1}, is then:
Πrn(l, h) = Pr(B |n) grB(n) + Pr(R |n) grR(n) (4)
=
1
1 + λn
[(
piR(1 + λl)− FR(h+ 1)(1− λl)
)[ λn − λh
1− λh+l
]
− FR(h− n)(1− λn)
]
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A similar method can be used to determine the expected payoff of the blue adversary
when the state is n ∈ {−l+1, ...,−1}, with the only exception that sampling is stopped at
n = −1 rather than at n = 0. We then get:
Πbn(l, h) = Pr(B |n) gbB(n) + Pr(R |n) gbR(n) (5)
=
1
1 + λn
[(
piB(1 + λh)− FB(l − 1)(1− λh)
)[1− λn+l
1− λh+l
]
+ FB(n+ l)(1− λn)
]
In a Markov equilibrium, the best response functions of the red and blue adversaries
are
h∗(l) = argmax
h
Πrn(l, h) and l
∗(h) = argmax
l
Πbn(l, h)
Taking first-order conditions in (4) and (5), we obtain:
−λh∗(l) lnλ
[
piR(1 + λl)− FR(h∗(l) + 1)(1− λl)
]
= FR(1− λh∗(l))(1− λl+h∗(l))
−λl∗(h) lnλ
[
piB(1 + λh)− FB(l∗(h)− 1)(1− λh)
]
= FB(1− λl∗(h))(1− λl∗(h)+h)
As expected, h∗ and l∗ do not depend on n, that is, the optimal stopping rules of the
two adversaries are not revised with the realizations of the sampling process. Notice
that ∂
2Πrn
∂h2
∣∣∣
h∗
< 0 and ∂
2Πbn
∂l2
∣∣∣
l∗
< 0, so h∗ and l∗ are indeed maxima. Note also that
∂h∗
∂piR
∝ ∂2Πrn∂h∂piR
∣∣∣
h∗
> 0, ∂h
∗
∂cR
∝ ∂2Πrn∂h∂cR
∣∣∣
h∗
< 0, ∂l
∗
∂piB
∝ ∂2Πbn∂l∂piB
∣∣∣
l∗
> 0, and ∂l
∗
∂cB
∝ ∂2Πbn∂l∂cB
∣∣∣
l∗
< 0,
Analogously, ∂h
∗
∂l ∝ ∂
2Πrn
∂h∂l
∣∣∣
h∗
< 0 and ∂l
∗
∂h ∝ ∂
2Πbn
∂h∂l
∣∣∣
l∗
< 0. 2
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Figure 1. Sampling strategies by blue and red adversaries
26
  
Fi
gu
re
 2
. S
am
pl
in
g 
fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s b
y 
st
at
e 
an
d 
co
st
 tr
ea
tm
en
t 
27
Session (date) # subjects costs (cR, cB) in matches
1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40
1 (06/03/2008) 8 (3,3) (3,13) (13,3) (13,13)
2 (06/04/2008) 10 (3,3) (13,13) (3,13) (13,3)
3 (06/09/2008) 10 (3,13) (3,3) (13,3) (13,13)
4 (06/09/2008) 10 (3,13) (13,3) (13,13) (3,3)
5 (06/11/2008) 10 (13,3) (3,13) (13,13) (3,3)
6 (06/12/2008) 10 (13,3) (13,13) (3,3) (3,13)
7 (06/16/2008) 10 (13,13) (3,3) (3,13) (13,3)
8 (06/16/2008) 10 (13,13) (13,3) (3,3) (3,13)
Table 1: Session details.
(cR, cB) −l∗ h∗
(3, 3) -3 3
(3, 13) -2 3
(13, 3) -4 1
(13, 13) -2 1
Table 2: Markov equilibrium.
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n (blue draws - red draws) -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
(cR, cB) = (3, 3)
# observations 51 158 266 439 791 407 245 98 18
Pr[red sampling – theory] .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 .00
Pr[red sampling – empirical] .02 .03 .01 .12 1.00 .92 .62 .30 .33
(standard error) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.01) (.03) (.05) (.11)
Pr[blue sampling – theory] .00 .00 1.00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Pr[blue sampling – empirical] .45 .45 .77 1.0 .14 .01 .00 .00 .00
(standard error) (.07) (.04) (.03) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00)
(cR, cB) = (3, 13)
# observations 13 58 223 394 731 394 216 88 26
Pr[red sampling – theory] .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 .00
Pr[red sampling – empirical] .15 .10 .02 .09 .99 .94 .67 .48 .39
(standard error) (.10) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.03) (.05) (.10)
Pr[blue sampling – theory] .00 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Pr[blue sampling – empirical] .54 .24 .31 .92 .06 .00 .00 .00 .00
(standard error) (13.8) (5.6) (3.1) (1.4) (0.9) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
(cR, cB) = (13, 3)
# observations 43 124 228 363 624 287 94 7 1
Pr[red sampling – theory] .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Pr[red sampling – empirical] .02 .01 .00 .04 .93 .52 .11 .14 .00
(standard error) (.02) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.14) n/a
Pr[blue sampling – theory] .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Pr[blue sampling – empirical] .37 .52 .87 1.00 .06 .00 .00 .00 .00
(standard error) (.08) (.05) (.02) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) n/a
(cR, cB) = (13, 13)
# observations 5 40 171 301 607 259 96 10 3
Pr[red sampling – theory] .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Pr[red sampling – empirical] .00 .00 .00 .02 .97 .55 .15 .40 .67
(standard error) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.04) (.16) (.33)
Pr[blue sampling – theory] .00 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Pr[blue sampling – empirical] .80 .13 .33 .97 .09 .00 .00 .00 .00
(standard error) (.20) (.05) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Table 3: Sampling frequencies.
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all states behind marginal states
Theory is draw .920 (.007) .870 (.013)
[6130] [2404]
Theory is no draw .609 (.029) .549 (.031)
[1819] [1156]
All .849 (.008) .766 (.010)
[7949] [3560]
Table 4: Proportion of equilibrium behavior when adversary is behind (standard errors
clustered at the individual level in parentheses; number of observations in brackets).
state n = −1 n = 0
(cR, cB) (3, 3) (3, 13) (13, 3) (13, 13) (3, 3) (3, 13) (13, 3) (13, 13)
blue payoff
(1) Empirical 20.0 -1.2 28.6 5.3 47.4 33.0 62.4 46.7
(2) Markov eq. 18.6 0.5 32.1 11.9 43.0 30.3 66.0 55.9
(3) Best response 22.6 3.3 31.0 9.4 49.7 36.6 64.2 50.3
red payoff
(1) Empirical 64.2 73.2 46.8 60.1 35.3 40.8 7.3 14.7
(2) Markov eq. 63.4 75.2 43.1 64.0 36.0 44.2 8.5 19.0
(3) Best response 66.6 75.8 50.2 62.2 38.5 44.7 12.3 18.4
Table 5: Expected payoffs of blue and red adversaries at n = −1 and n = 0.
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n (blue - red draws) -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
(cR, cB) = (3, 3)
red draw 93.9 87.5 73.0 58.3 38.5 16.1 3.4 -2.6 -3.0
red no draw 99.7 98.0 88.7 66.6 3.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
blue draw -3.0 -1.1 6.1 22.6 43.6 61.1 79.1 91.8 94.5
blue no draw 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.7 49.7 76.3 93.9 99.3 99.9
(cR, cB) = (3, 13)
red draw 95.1 93.5 79.8 60.5 44.7 19.5 4.8 -1.8 -3.0
red no draw 99.9 99.7 96.9 75.8 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
blue draw -14.3 -14.1 -17.1 3.3 20.9 32.1 54.4 72.9 80.4
blue no draw 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 36.6 68.9 91.0 98.3 99.8
(cR, cB) = (13, 3)
red draw 76.8 64.7 44.7 33.4 12.3 -10.7 -13.0 -13.0 -13.0
red no draw 99.4 96.0 80.5 50.2 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
blue draw -4.1 0.6 9.8 31.0 47.1 70.1 91.7 96.4 96.9
blue no draw 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 64.2 91.6 99.6 100.0 100.0
(cR, cB) = (13, 13)
red draw 78.4 78.3 57.1 36.6 18.4 -6.4 -13.0 -13.0 -13.0
red no draw 99.9 99.8 94.9 62.2 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
blue draw -13.0 -13.0 -13.0 9.4 26.1 44.9 74.5 80.0 78.6
blue no draw 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 50.3 87.6 99.3 99.9 100.0
Table 6: Values to drawing and not drawing by state.
adversary red blue
(cR, cB) (3, 3) (3, 13) (13, 3) (13, 13) (3, 3) (3, 13) (13, 3) (13, 13)
marginal state
Theory is draw .62 .67 .93 .97 .77 .92 .52 .97
Theory is no draw .30 .48 .52 .55 .45 .31 .37 .33
Table 7: Empirical probabilities of drawing in marginal states.
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all states behind marginal states
low cost high cost low cost high cost
Theory is draw .909 (.008) .943 (.010) .727 (.029) .939 (.011)
[4204] [1926] [779] [1625]
Theory is no draw .585 (.042) .619 (.029) .592 (.043) .528 (.034)
[535] [1284] [387] [769]
All .873 (.007) .814 (.015) .682 (.016) .807 (.013)
[4739] [3210] [1166] [2394]
Table 8: Proportion of equilibrium behavior by adversaries’ own cost (standard errors
clustered at the individual level in parentheses; number of observations in brackets).
blue red
cB = 3 cB = 13 cR = 3 cR = 13 cR = 3 cR = 13 cB = 3 cB = 13
constant 2.34** 1.58** 2.30** 3.00** 3.11** 1.78** 3.50** 3.10**
(.269) (.389) (.422) (.347) (.218) (.340) (.294) (.344)
draws behind -.710** -.642* -.641** -.822** -.990** -.713** -1.02** -.779**
(.144) (.282) (.216) (.192) (.090) (.192) (.126) (.148)
seq. late .241 .889 .199 .579 -.261 1.79** -.163 .251
(.216) (.460) (.371) (.366) (.335) (.355) (.345) (.272)
draw × seq. -.121 -.655* -.140 -.381 .134 -1.19** .097 -.179
(.108) (.316) (.237) (.219) (.147) (.209) (.173) (1.42)
exp. .011 .541 .388 -.179 .045 .594* .184 .141
(.219) (.410) (.296) (.354) (.230) (.300) (.255) (.243)
draw × exp. .041 -.331 -.187 .125 .006 -.346 -.096 -.028
(.114) (.291) (.186) (.202) (.098) (.182) (.131) (.136)
high own c — — -.836** -1.17** — — -1.26** -1.08**
(.165) (.164) (.118) (.157)
high other c .244* .022 — — .150 .248* — —
(.110) (.100) (.096) (.110)
adj. R2 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.33
Table 9: Probit regression on probability of sampling (standard errors clustered at indi-
vidual level in parentheses; * = significant at 5% level, ** = significant at 1% level).
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all states behind marginal states
seq. 1 & 2 seq. 3 & 4 seq. 1 & 2 seq. 3 & 4
Theory is draw .915 (.009) .925 (.008) .861 (.018) .879 (.014)
[3064] [3066] [1203] [1201]
Theory is no draw .571 (.036) .653 (.029) .506 (.040) .591 (.035)
[972] [847] [571] [585]
All .832 (.011) .866 (.008) .747 (.014) .785 (.013)
[4036] [3913] [1774] [1786]
Table 11: Proportion of equilibrium behavior by sequence (standard errors clustered at
individual level in parentheses; number of observations in brackets).
all states behind marginal states
inexperienced experienced inexperienced experienced
Theory is draw .915 (.008) .925 (.008) .860 (.015) .881 (.015)
[3112] [3018] [1239] [1165]
Theory is no draw .609 (.033) .609 (.028) .557 (.035) .542 (.034)
[896] [923] [580] [576]
All .847 (.009) .851 (.009) .764 (.011) .769 (.013)
[4008] [3941] [1819] [1741]
Table 12: Proportion of equilibrium behavior by level of experience (standard errors clus-
tered at individual level in parentheses; number of observations in brackets).
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